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Bump, Set, Spiked: Determining Whether
the National Collegiate Athletic Association
Is a Recipient of Federal Funds
Under Title IX
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the enactment of the Education Amendments of 1972,2 a major issue
facing the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA") and its member
schools has been the applicability of Title IX of the Amendments to those
organizations. Title IX provides that no organization that operates educational
programs may discriminate on the basis of sex if that program receives federal
financial assistance Like many other federal antidiscrimination acts, the main
debate under Title IX involves when a particular organization can be deemed to
be "receiving" federal financial assistance. While the majority of NCAA
member schools receive federal funds, the NCAA as an entity has never been
held to be a recipient of federal funds and as such has not been held to the
standards established in Title IX.
In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, the United States Supreme
Court determined that the NCAA was not a recipient of federal financial
assistance by virtue of accepting membership dues from institutions that do
receive federal funding.4 However, the Court left unresolved the issue of
whether the NCAA might be a recipient of federal funding under either of two
alternative theories proposed by plaintiff Smith. The Court's emphasis on
Smith's proposed theories indicates that Title IX coverage of the NCAA may
soon be a reality.
1-. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1991, Renee Smith began her college education at St. Bonaventure
University.' She played volleyball for St. Bonaventure for two seasons between
1991 and 1993, electing not to play the following year.6 After graduating early
from St. Bonaventure, during the 1994-95 athletic year Smith enrolled in a
1. 525 U.S. 459 (1999).
2. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994).
4. Smith, 525 U.S. at 470.
5. Id. at 464. St. Bonaventure University is a member of the NCAA and fields
athletic teams in many different NCAA sanctioned sports, including men's and women's
basketball and women's volleyball.
6. Id.
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postgraduate program at Hofstra University, and during the 1995-96 athletic year
she enrolled in another postgraduate program at the University of Pittsburgh!
During both seasons Smith sought to play intercollegiate volleyball but the
NCAA denied her eligibility to participate because of restrictions on the
eligibility of postbaccalaureate students.' The NCAA's Postbaccalaureate
Bylaw, an exception to the general NCAA rule that only undergraduate students
can participate in intercollegiate athletics, states that a postgraduate student-
athlete may participate in intercollegiate athletics only if she seeks to participate
at the same institution that awarded her an undergraduate degree. 9 At Smith's
request, both Hofstra University and the University of Pittsburgh petitioned the
NCAA to waive the restrictions, and each time the NCAA refused.'0
In August 1996, Smith filed suit against the NCAA alleging that its refusal
to grant her a waiver to play intercollegiate athletics at Hofstra University and
the University of Pittsburgh was based on sex, in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972."1 Specifically, she alleged that the NCAA
discriminated on the basis of sex by granting more postgraduate athletic waivers
to male student-athletes than to female student-athletes.'2 The NCAA moved to
dismiss Smith's Title IX complaint, arguing that the complaint failed to allege
that the NCAA was a recipient of federal financial assistance and therefore was
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See NCAA, 1993-94 MANUAL, Bylaw 14.1.8.2, at 123. The full
Postbaccalaureate Bylaw states:
A student athlete who is enrolled in a graduate or professional school of the
institution he or she previously attended as an undergraduate (regardless of
whether the individual has received a United States baccalaureate degree or
its equivalent), a student-athlete who is enrolled and seeking a second
baccalaureate or equivalent degree at the same institution, or a student-athlete
who has graduated and is continuing as a full-time student at the same
institution while taking course work that would lead to the equivalent of
another major or degree as defined and documented by the institution, may
participate in intercollegiate athletics, provided the student has eligibility
remaining and such participation occurs within the applicable five-year or 10-
semester period set forth in 14.2.
Id.
10. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,464 (1999).
11. Id. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). Smith's complaint also stated claims
under the Sherman Act and state contract law. Smith, 525 U.S. at 464. The district court
dismissed the Sherman Act claim and declined to retain jurisdiction over the state law
claim. Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 978 F. Supp. 213, 218-20 (W.D. Pa.
1997). The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the Sherman Act claim, Smith v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d. 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998), and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari on that issue. Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 525
U.S. 872 (1998).
12. Smith, 525 U.S. at 464-65.
[Vol. 65
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not subject to suit under Title X 3 In response Smith argued that because the
NCAA governs the federally funded intercollegiate athletic programs of its
member institutions, that these programs were educational in nature, and the
NCAA benefits financially from the federal funds received by its members, the
NCAA was subject to suit under Title IX. 4
The district court granted the NCAA's motion and dismissed Smith's suit,
concluding that the alleged connection between the NCAA and the federal
financial assistance of its member institutions was "too far attenuated" to
maintain a Title IX claim. 5 Smith then sought leave to amend her complaint to
add Hofstra University and the University of Pittsburgh as defendants, and to
allege both that the NCAA receives federal funding through another recipient
and also that the NCAA operates an educational program or activity that benefits
from the receipt of this funding. 6 The district court denied Smith's motion as
moot because the case had already been dismissed. 7
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's refusal to grant Smith leave
to amend her complaint because Smith's proposed amended complaint "would
have been sufficient to bring the NCAA within the scope of Title IX as a
recipient of federal funds and would have survived a motion to dismiss." 8 The
NCAA subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court.' 9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari2° to determine "whether a private
organization that does not receive federal financial assistance is subject to Title
IX because it receives payments from entities that do."21 Smith argued that
member dues were sufficient to bring the NCAA within the reach of Title IX.
Smith also proposed two alternative theories for why the NCAA should be
subject to Title IX.' First, she contended that the NCAA received federal funds
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting Smith, 978 F. Supp. at 219-20).
16. Id. The National Youth Sports Program Fund receives federal funds in
connection with the National Youth Sports Program, an entity that the NCAA created
that conducts summer programs on college campuses around the country, but from which
the NCAA contends it is distinct. The National Youth Sports Program Fund receives
assistance from a Community Services Block Grant through the Department of Health
and Human Services. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 1998 WL 858534 (Dec. 8
1998) (No. 98-84).
17. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 465 (1999).
18. Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d. 180, 190 (3d Cir.
1998).
19. Smith, 525 U.S. at 465.
20. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 524 U.S. 982 (1998).
21. Smith, 525 U.S. at 465.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 469-70.
2000]
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both directly and indirectly 'through the National Youth Sports Program.24
Second, Smith argued that when a recipient of federal funds cedes authority over
a federally funded program to another entity, the controlling entity becomes
amenable to Title IX regardless of whether the controlling entity receives federal
funding itself.' The Supreme Court held that the NCAA was not subject to Title
IX simply because it receives funds from members who do receive federal
funding.26 However, the Court declined to discuss whether the NCAA would be
subject to Title IX under either of the alternative theories proposed by Smith
because the issues were not raised in the lower courts.27
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex in any educational program or activity that receives federal
financial assistance.' Similar to other federal antidiscrimination acts," the main
legal controversy regarding Title IX has been over the scope of Title IX and its
applicability in different situations. While there are many issues that arise in the
course of Title IX litigation, this Note is limited to the examination of when a
private program or organization is deemed to be "receiving" federal financial
assistance.
The debate over the applicability of Title DC can be divided into two
schools of thought: (1) the program-specific approach, and (2) the institution-
wide approach.30 Under the program-specific approach, Title IX is applicable
only to the specific program within the organization that receives federal
24. Id. at 469. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
25. Id. at 469-70. The United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of
Smith's alternative contentions that the NCAA should be subject to Title IX. Id. The
Government supported all of Smith's contentions, including that the NCAA was a
recipient of federal funds through the National Youth Sports Program. Id.
26. Id. at 468-70.
27. Id. at 470.
28. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). Title IX states: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act on the basis of disability in "any program or activity receiving federal
assistance"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994) (prohibiting race discrimination in "any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"); 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1994) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of age in "any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance").
30. See Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Suits By Female Athletes Against Colleges and
Universities Claiming That Decisions To Discontinue Particular Sports or To Deny
Varsity Status To Particular Sports Deprive Plaintiffs of Equal Educational
Opportunities Required By Title IX, 129 A.L.R. FED. 571 (1996).
[Vol. 65
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funding.3 Under the institution-wide approach, if any program within an
organization receives federal financial assistance, then the entire organization is
subject to Title IX regulation.32 These two tests lead to vastly different results.
During the 1970s and much of the 1980s, courts applied the program-
specific approach to Title IX questions.33 Efforts to change this policy came to
the forefront in Haffer v. Temple University.34 In Haffer, eight female
undergraduates brought suit against Temple University claiming that the
University's disproportionate spending on men's athletic programs violated Title
IX 35 Temple argued that although the University as a whole received federal
funds, its athletic program received no earmarked federal funding and
consequently was not subject to Title IX.36 The Third Circuit upheld the district
court's application of the institution-wide approach and held that Temple
University's athletic department was subject to Title IX regulation because other
programs at the University benefitted from federal funds.37 The Third Circuit
based its decision on Grove City College v. Bell,38 a Third Circuit ruling that was
decided while Haffer was pending.39 The Third Circuit's application of the
institution-wide approach to Title IX issues was subsequently addressed by the
Supreme Court in Grove City College v. Bell.'
Grove City was the first case in which the Supreme Court addressed the
applicability of Title IX to an institution that did not directly receive federal
funding.4' Grove City College was a private institution that received no direct
state or federal financial assistance, but did enroll students who received Basic
Educational Opportunity Grants, ("BEOGs")42 under the Department of
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. See generally Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
737 F.2d. 520 (6th Cir. 1982) (lower court opinion vacated for reconsideration under the
standards established in Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3rd Cir. 1982));
University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982) (private university's
attempt to block a Department of Education investigation into its athletic department);
Brunswick Sch. Bd. v. Califano, 449 F. Supp, 866 (S.D. Me. 1978) (program-specific
approach applied to federal employment practices mandate under Title IX involving
pregnancy and high school teachers).
34. 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 17.
38. 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
39. Haffer, 688 F.2d at 17.
40. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
41. However, the Court had previously examined Title IX's language and
legislative history and determined that an agency's right to issue or terminate funds under
Title IX was subject to the "program-specific limitations of §§ 901 and 902." North
Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 538 (1982).
42. Basic Educational Opportunity Grants, or Pell Grants, were designed by
20001
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Education's Alternate Disbursement System.43 The Supreme Court affirmed the
Third Circuit's ruling that the indirect receipt of federal funds by Grove City
through its students receipt of BEOGs was sufficient to bring the college within
the scope of Title IX. However, the Court specifically rejected the institution-
wide approach applied by the Third Circuit.45 The Court stated that Title IX
should be applied using a program-specific approach and that Grove City's
financial aid department, as the only department receiving the federal BEOG
monies, should be the only program at Grove City required to comply with Title
IX.' Because BEOGs are not "unrestricted grants" that a college can use for
any purpose, but are grants designed to make college available to students who
cannot afford it, the Court held that the federal money provided to Grove City
only implicated the university's financial aid department under Title IX"
In 1987, Congress, unhappy with the Supreme Court's limited view of Title
IX in Grove City, passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987.48 The Act
was designed specifically by Congress to "restore the prior consistent and long-
standing executive branch interpretation and broad, institution-wide application
of those laws as previously administered." '49 The Act overturned Grove City and
extended Title IX coverage to entire organizations, so long as any part of an
organization operates an educational program and receives federal financial
assistance."0 Hence, the Act spelled the end of the program-specific approach
to Title IX questions."
Congress to assist students in paying for a post secondary education. See 20 U.S.C. §
1070(a) (1994).
43. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 559. Under the Alternate Disbursement System,
BEOG monies are paid directly to institutions on behalf of eligible enrolled students. See
20 U.S.C. § 1070a(a)(1) (1994).
44. Grove City, 465 U.S. at 563-70.
45. Id. at 572-73.
46. Id. at 573-74.
47. Id. at 573.
48. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).
49. Pub. L. No. 100-259 § 2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
50. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 has
been construed consistently with this intent. See, e.g., Williams v. School Dist. of
Bethlehem, 998 F.2d. 168, 171 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994)
(Title IX applied to all programs in the school district despite the limited scope of federal
funding); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993) (Title IX applied to
the entire university even though only specific programs received federal monies).
51. This point is further reiterated by Title IX regulations promulgated by the
Department of Education. A "recipient" of federal funds is defined as:
[A]ny State or political subdivision thereof, or any instrumentality of a State
or political subdivision thereof, any public or private agency, institution, or
organization, or other entity, or any person, to whom Federal financial
assistance is extended directly or through another recipient and which
operates an education program or activity which receives or benefits from
[Vol. 65
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Between its decisions in Grove City and Smith, the Supreme Court had only
one occasion to specifically address Title IX.12 However, the Court had
discussed the broader issue of when an organization is deemed to be "receiving"
federal financial assistance. In United States Department of Transportation v.
Paralyzed Veterans ofAmerica,"3 the question was whether extensive federal
financial assistance provided to airports and the federally operated air traffic
control system, was sufficient to make Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
applicable to commercial airlines.-4 Paralyzed Veterans of America argued that
while commercial airlines did not directly receive federal funding, airport
operators converted the federal funds they received into facilities that were for
the direct economic benefit of the airlines; thus, the commercial airlines were
"indirect recipients" of federal aid.-5 Furthermore, Paralyzed Veterans of
America argued that Grove City stood for the proposition that federal financial
assistance could be either direct or indirect.-6
The Supreme Court ruled that the Grove City decision "does not stand for
the proposition that federal coverage follows the aid past the recipient to those
who merely benefit from the aid. 57 The Supreme Court also rejected the
reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit that airports and airlines were so
"inextricably intertwined" that the nexus between them made the airlines liable
as recipients of federal funds.5 ' The Court concluded that the determination of
whether a program is a "recipient" of federal funds is to be determined by the
scope of the grant statute, not by "hypothetical collective concepts" like
commercial air travels. 9
Athletic associations, like the NCAA, present a similar problem to that of
Paralyzed Veterans. Specifically, the question is whether an association's
receipt of dues from members who operate educational programs and receive
federal financial assistance is enough to bring the association within the reach
of Title IX. In Homer v. Kentucky High School Athletic Ass'n,6O the Sixth
such assistance, including any subunit, successor, assignee, or transferee
thereof.
34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1998).
52. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66-69 (1992)
(holding that Title IX does imply a private right of action for individuals seeking
remedies under the statute).
53. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
54. Id. at 599. Rehabilitation Act § 504 was the precursor to the Americans with
Disabilities Act and was designed to prevent discrimination against individuals with
disabilities in federally funded programs. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
55. Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. at 606.
56. Id. at 606-07.
57. Id. at 607.
58. Id. at 610.
59. Id. at611.
60. 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994).
20001
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Circuit held that the Kentucky High School Athletic Association ("Association")
was a recipient of federal funds under Title IX.6 The court based its decision on
two factors: (1) that Kentucky law defined actions of the Association as actions
of the Kentucky State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education, which
itself was subject to Title IX; and (2) that the Association received dues from
member schools that received federal funds.62 While not basing its decision
solely on the receipt of dues from federally funded members, the Homer court
did advance the idea that this concept would be significant in future
determinations regarding the applicability of Title IX to athletic associations.63
The Supreme Court was confronted with this question in Smith.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The unanimous opinion of the Court in Smith first examined the language
of Title IX and the Civil Rights Restoration Act and concluded that if any part
of the NCAA received federal assistance, then all NCAA operations would be
.subject to the requirements of Title IX.6 The Court then examined its holdings
in Grove City and Paralyzed. Veterans to clarify the circumstances under which
an entity would qualify as a recipient of federal funds.65 The Court also
examined the Third Circuit's decision not to apply the "recipient" of federal
funds definition established in Paralyzed Veterans.66 The Court reasoned that
by interpreting Section (h) of the regulation to extend Title IX coverage to
beneficiaries of federal funding as well as recipients, the Third Circuit did not
give effect to the entire text of Section 106.2(h).67 The Court held that the first
part of Section 106.2(h) of the regulations, defining a recipient as any entity "to
whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another
recipient and which operates an education program or activity which receives or
benefits from such assistance," was in accord with the precedents established in
61. Id. at 272. In Homer, female high school student athletes in the State of
Kentucky sued the athletic association and the State Board for Elementary and Secondary
Education alleging that the refusal of the athletic association to sanction girls'
interscholastic fast-pitch softball as a varsity sport was discrimination against females in
violation of Title IX. Id. at 268.
62. Id. at 272.
63. The Court has also recently agreed to examine Title IX's applicability to state
high school athletic associations based on the state action doctrine under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1994). See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 180
F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000).
64. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 465-66 (1999).
65. Id. at 466-69.
66. Id. at 467-69. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
67. Smith, 525 U.S. at 468.
[Vol. 65
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Grove City and Paralyzed Veterans, and Title IX coverage was not triggered
when an entity merely benefits from federal funding.68
The Court further stated that the mere receipt of member dues by the
NCAA demonstrated, at most, that the NCAA indirectly benefits from the
federal assistance provided to its members, and that this alone, without more,
was not sufficient to trigger Title IX coverage.69 The Court also explained that
while "evident" distinctions exist between the relationship of airlines and
airports in Paralyzed Veterans and the relationship between the NCAA and its
members, 0 those distinctions were not relevant to the "narrow" issue of
"whether an entity that receive[d] dues from recipients of federal funds [was] for
that reason a recipient itself."7'
Finally, the Court declined to address the two alternative theories proposed
by Smith to bring the NCAA under the umbrella of Title IX: (1) whether the
NCAA receives federal funding through the National Youth Sports Program, and
(2) whether the NCAA's control over its member schools' athletic programs
renders it a recipient of federal funds7 While acknowledging that the NCAA
may receive funds through the National Youth Sports Program,71 the Court
nevertheless declined to address Smith's alternative theories because they were
not decided by the lower court.74
68. Id.
69. Id.
,70. The NCAA is "created by and comprised of' schools that receive federal funds
and governs those schools with respect to their athletic rules and regulations. The Third
Circuit urged that this relationship is "qualitatively different" from that of airlines and
airports. Smith v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180, 188-89 (3d Cir.
1998).
71. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459,469 (1999).
72. Id. at 469-70.
73. Id. at 470 nn.6-7. Two district courts have held that the National Youth Sports
Program's relationship to the NCAA created a genuine issue of fact as to whether the
NCAA was a recipient of federal financial assistance. See Bowers v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 91 F. Supp. 2d 460, 494 (D.N.J. 1998) (denying motion for summary
judgment on a Rehabilitation Act suit against the NCAA because genuine questions of
fact existed concerning whether the NCAA received federal money through the National
Youth Sports Program); Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. CIV.A.97-
131, 1997 WL 634376, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 1997) (refusing summary judgment in a
Title VI action against the NCAA). The Department of Health and Human Services has
also issued two letter determinations that the NCAA is a recipient of federal financial
assistance through the Department's grant to the National Youth Sports Program Fund.
Smith, 525 U.S. at 470 n.7.
74. Smith, 525 U.S. at 470. Smith's alternative theories were alluded to in her
brief to the Third Circuit. Id. at 470 n.6.
2000]
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V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court's decision in Smith appears consistent with precedent,
but leaves many important questions about the reasons for the Court's holding
unanswered. Moreover, the Court appears to have left open the possibility of
Title IX application to the NCAA. Given the Court's inadequate basis for its
decision, it is unclear exactly what impact Smith will have on future Title IX
cases.
The Smith decision affirmed the language of the Supreme Court's decision
in Paralyzed Veterans. Specifically, in order to bring a private organization
under the umbrella of federal law-Title IX, the Rehabilitation Act, or other
similar laws relating to'federally funded activities-a potential plaintiff must
show that the private organization does not merely "benefit" from federal
financial assistance, but actually receives such assistance, either directly or
indirectly. In Paralyzed Veterans, the benefits received were the facilities and
runways that the airports constructed with federal grant money and provided to
commercial airlines for their use. In Smith, the benefits received by the NCAA
were the monetary dues paid by member schools to whom federal financial
assistance was extended. This is an important, yet tenuous, distinction. While
airlines benefit from the conversion of federal financial assistance into facilities,
the NCAA benefits directly by receiving money from its member schools. Still,
the Supreme Court refused to extend the application of Title IX to any
organization that receives money from members that receive federal financial
assistance. Such a broad application of Title IX would yield almost "limitless
coverage" to private groups and organizations.' The Supreme Court's decision
in Smith expounds the rationale of Paralyzed Veterans and yet changes little
about the current policy of Title IX application.
However, whether Title IX could apply to the NCAA in future cases
remains an open question. The Supreme Court made clear in Smith that a
member school's receipt of federal funds was not a sufficient basis for bringing
the NCAA under Title IX. However, the Court in Smith did hint as to how Title
IX might be applied to the NCAA in the future. While unable to rule on Smith's
two alternative theories because they were not addressed by the lower court, the
Court sets out at length in a footnote the apparently strong allegations that the
NCAA does receive federal financial assistance directly through the National
Youth Sports Program. 76 Furthermore, the Court hinted that with the right
75. Id. at 467.
76. Id. at 470. The Court cited the decision in Bowers v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 493-94 (D.N.J. 1998), which notes the following
evidence concerning the National Youth Sports Program: (1) that an NCAA committee
administers the National Youth Sports program; (2) that the powers of the fund are
limited by the NCAA; (3) that the executive director of the NCAA and the chair of the
NCAA committee sit on the board of the fund; (4) that all members of the board are
employees of the NCAA or the NCAA committee; (5) that the fund must report annually
[Vol. 65
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judicial vehicle, Title IX coverage could possibly be extended to the NCAA in
a future case. Less than one month after Smith, that case may have arrived.
In March 1999, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania decided Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn." In
Cureton, a Title V1n action, the court upheld the precedent established in Smith
and refused to allow the plaintiffs to claim that the NCAA was a recipient of
federal funds because of its receipt of dues from its federally funded member
institutions.!9 However, the Cureton court held that the NCAA was a recipient
of federal funds because: (1) the NCAA completely controls the National Youth
Sports Program Fund, which is funded through a block grant from the United
States Department of Health and Human Services, thereby qualifying the NCAA
as an indirect recipient of federal funds; and (2) the federally funded member
schools of the NCAA have ceded control over their athletic programs to the
NCAA. ° Hence, less than one month after the Supreme Court's decision in
Smith, the NCAA was again labeled a recipient of federal funds, this time under
one of the alternative theories proposed by Smith.
Where does Title IX go from here? More importantly, where should it go?
While universities around the country have been required to restructure their
intercollegiate athletic programs to comply with the mandates of Title IX, it was
inevitable that the issue of Title IX and its application to the NCAA would
eventually arise. To typical sports fans, the difference between their favorite
collegiate athletic team and the NCAA may be non-existent. Any discussion of
intercollegiate athletics invariably includes references to NCAA tournaments,
NCAA eligibility, and NCAA sanctions of member institutions. The NCAA and
its member schools are so closely linked, both on the field and in the classroom,
that any attempt to distinguish the two is tenuous. While schools need the
NCAA to oversee intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA needs member schools to
continue to field athletic teams to oversee.
If federal financial assistance to a school's academic program frees up
university funds allowing it to field an athletic team, then doesn't the NCAA
receive one more member because of federal assistance? Much like individuals
whose financial records do not disclose the true extent of their wealth, the legal
to the NCAA Council; (6) that upon dissolution of the fund, its assets are to be
distributed to the NCAA; and (7) that the NCAA's executive director referred to the fund
as one of the NCAA's best kept secrets. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
77. 37 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1994) prohibits racial discrimination in
federally funded programs. The district court's decision in Cureton was later overruled
by the Third Circuit because it held that Title VI was not subject to the same interpretive
mandates as Title IX, but the court assumed that the NCAA was subject to Title IX under
the facts presented. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Cureton, 198 F.3d 107 (3d Cir.
1999).
79. Cureton, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 694.
80. Id. at 694-95.
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distinction between the NCAA and its member schools ignores the practical
significance of the relationship between the two. With the Smith decision, the
Supreme Court, by allowing the NCAA to discriminate while subjecting its
member institutions to Title IX, creates a large philosophical gap that will have
to be filled at some point in the future. The Cureton decision is an important
first step in filling this gap.
While organizations comprised of members who receive federal financial
assistance may be relieved by the Court's ruling in Smith, they should also be
mindful of its lesson. As the differences between member and overseer become
smaller, courts are likely to allow less "benefit" to an organization before they
conclude that the organization has received enough of a benefit. While the
receipt of dues from federally funded members may not be enough to qualify an
organization as a recipient of federal funds, alternative theories appear to be
gaining prominence as the courts look to expand the broad, remedial purpose of
Title IX and its progeny.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Smith,"1 the Supreme Court ruled that organizations that receive dues
from members that receive federal financial assistance were not themselves
"recipients" of federal financial assistance under Title IX. The decision shielded
the NCAA from Title IX requirements in this case, but the Court left the door
open as to whether the NCAA may be held amenable under an alternative theory
proposed by Smith. While the Court's decision shields some organizations from
liability, it does reiterate the institution-wide approach to Title IX application
adopted by the Court in Paralyzed Veterans.82 As the distinction between public
and private becomes smaller, in order for an organization such as the NCAA to
escape the requirements of Title IX, it will be required to show that absolutely
no part of its organization receives any federal financial assistance. After the
Court's decision in Smith, it is unclear whether the NCAA will continue to be
able to make such a distinction in future cases.
MATr=EW P. HAMNER
81. 525 U.S. 459 (1999).
82. 477 U.S. 597 (1986).
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